Like the history of much of Husserl’s work, the history of his contribution to a phenomenology of the body is in part a history of understandable misunderstandings and subsequent reevaluations concerning the scope and significance of his achievements. To a certain extent, this is due not so much to what he actually said on this topic, but to the circumstances under which he said or wrote it—university lecture course? unpublished book draft? published work? research manuscript? conversation noted down by others?—and (...) to the sequence and manner in which this work gradually became available to the larger phenomenological community. For example, it was widely held at one time, primarily on the basis of Ideas I (see, e.g., III: §§ 39, 53–54),2 that Husserl dealt only with a disembodied and desituated consciousness, and that it was only with the advent of existential phenomenology that the body truly became an important phenomenological theme. However, we now know that Merleau-Ponty, for example, drew upon Husserl’s manuscripts for many of the descriptions and insights developed in the extensive and influential discussions of the body in Phenomenology of Perception (see Van Breda 1962/1992). Moreover, though it is now more readily acknowledged that Husserl did indeed take the body into account, some still assume or imply that he did so only toward the end of his life. Yet a closer examination of material published to date reveals that Husserl was concerned with bodilihood in texts from many different periods.3 A fuller appreciation of the range and richness of Husserl’s work in phenomenology of the body is nevertheless emerging only slowly.4 It is the purpose of this essay to help establish a basis for such appreciation by sorting out and summarizing certain key contributions to a phenomenology of the body in Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, Second Book, and by indicating the continuing relevance of Husserl’s achievements in this text to current issues. (shrink)

This paper thematizes the operative kinaesthetic style of world-experiencing life by turning to the ongoing how of our habitual bodily comportment: to our deeply sedimented way(s) of making a body; to schematic inner vectors or tendencies toward movement that persist as bodily ghost gestures even if one is not making the larger, visible gestures they imply; and to inadvertent isometrics, i.e., persisting patterns of trying, bracing, freezing, etc. All such micromovements witness to our sociality insofar as they are not only (...) socially shaped, but perpetuate certain styles of intercorporeal interaction and sustain certain modes of responsivity. Reactivating the sediment -- retrieving the tacit choreography of everyday life from its anonymity and sensing our ongoing ways of living out the legacy of our communal body -- not only allows one''s individual bodily style to shift, but can open new possibilities for healthy interkinaesthetic comportment. Such work can thus contribute to an embodied ethics in both theory and practice. (shrink)

Ethics & Behavior, Volume 21, Issue 3, Page 261-262, May-June 2011.

Some facets of making music are explored by combining arguments of Raffman's cognitivist explanation of ineffability with Merleau-Ponty's view of embodied perception. Behnke's approach to a phenomenology of playing a musical instrument serves as a further source. Focusing on the skilled performer-listener, several types of ineffable knowledge of performing music are identified: gesture feeling ineffability —the performer's sensorimotor knowledge of the gestures necessary to produce instrumental sounds is not exhaustively communicable via language; gesture nuance ineffability —the performer is aware (...) of nuances of instrumental gestures, e.g., micro-variations of intensity or duration of musical gestures, but cannot perceptually, and consequently conceptually, categorize those fine-grained variations; and ineffabilities of inter-subjectivity —the non-verbal interaction between performers that makes a performance a vibrant dialogue is similarly incommunicable. An attempt to identify some of the ineffable dimensions of this dialogue is proposed. Further ineffabilities relating the acoustical embedding of performing are identified. (shrink)

I think that to Lord Kelvin is attributed the saying that the scientific attitude to a thing, if you can't do anything else with it, is to measure it. This is the attitude I propose to adopt towards Time . The situation is to some extent analogous to the situation with regard to electricity . Science is unable to say what electricity is, and so it almost denies the word any entrance into a treatise on the subject. It replaces it (...) by the word charge , which is something that can be measured. It is important to avoid hypostatizing time into a thing-in-itself. Instead of trying to say what time is we try to find a way of measuring it. (shrink)

Although the equally pervasive and abstract concept of space has generated a vast body of disciplines, time, and the related idea of "becoming" (transforming, ...